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RECENT CASES
ASSAULTS BY FELLOW-E MPLOYEES IN WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION CASES

Pittman and Stewart were engaged in laying a concrete floor in a
garage building. During an interval in which they had no duties to perform, Stewart tossed an empty cigarette package at Pittman, who retaliated
by tossing back a pebble. Subsequently, after this "horseplay" had ceased
and the men had returned to their work, Stewart struck Pittman over the
head with a shovel, resulting in a serious and permanent brain injury.
Workmen's Compensation was awarded Pittman. Held, on appeal, that
plaintiff was entitled to compensation as the nature of the work brought
the two men together, one of the hazards of which was that of an assault
by one upon the other. Mutual Implement and Hardware Insurance Company v. Pittman, 59 So.2d 547 (1952).
This decision represents the liberal construction of the compensation
law. The acts were originally enacted to change the liability for injury
to workmen from one based upon fault to one based upon the relation
of the injury to the employment. This relation was stated in most of the
statutes to be that the injury must occur in the course of and arise out
of the employment. Here there was no question in regard to the assault
occurring in the course of the employment. The inquiry is whether or
not it arose out of the employment.
The rule is generally stated that if the assault grew out of some incident or condition of the employment, it is compensable;' whereas if it
was the result of an assault committed solely for personal gratification,
then compensation will be denied. 2 The difficulty in applying the rule
is in determining what is an incident or risk of the employment. The
courts are not in agreement on this question; some take a strict and narrow view, while others follow a broad interpretation. Thus in Mountain
Ice Co. v. McNeil,3 two employees were engaged in "horseplay" and were
ordered back to work by the president of the company and the foreman.
After they had resumed their work, McNeil was struck on the side of the
head with an ice pick by the fellow employee. Compensation was denied.
Similarly, in Rice v. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc.4 the petitioner was
hit over the head with a shovel while working in a factory. The court
denied compensation, stating that mere association of workmen on the
job was not enough to establish a causal connection between the working
environment and the assault. Compensation was also denied where the
workman was shot while attempting to get out of the way of two work1.

2.

3.
4.

Anderson v. Security Bldg. Co., 100 Conn. 373, 123 A. 843, 40 A.L.R. 1119 (1924);
Gavros' Case, 240 Mass. 399, 134 N.E. 269, 21 A.L.R. 755 (1922); McNical's Case,
215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A. 1916A 316 (1913); Heitz v. Ruppert, 218 N.Y. 148,
112 N.E. 750, L.R.A. 1917A 344 (1916).
Jacquemin v. Turner and S. Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 A. 115, L.R.A. 1918E 496
(1918); Chicago v. Industrial Commission, 292 Ill. 406, 127 N.E. 49, 15 A.L.R. 586

(1920).
91 N.J.L. 528, 103 A. 184, L.R.A. 1918E 494 (1918).
186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166 (1946).
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men who were assaulting another, 5 and where the assault was the result
of a quarrel over the use of a ladle in a steel mill.6
In Ferguson v. Cady-McFarland Gravel Company,7 where a track
employee was struck on the head by a fellow employee for unknown reasons,
the court granted compensation, basing its decision on the theory that the
employment subjected the workman to a greater risk of assault than he
would be exposed to outside of the employment. A similar result was
reached in a case in which the workman was shot and killed while riding
home from work on a logging train, the transportation being furnished
by the employer.8 The court went so far as to state that the employment
threw the deceased workman and his assailant together and aggravated a
pre-existing condition. The case quoted most often by those courts favoring the liberal view is Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo.9
In this case an assault was committed as the result of the victim calling
the other workman "Shorty". Here the court held that the mere association of workmen on the job was a sufficient risk of the employment to
find a causal relation to the work neessary for, an award of compensation.
A case involving similar facts has not been adjudicated in Wyoming.
However, if such a case arose, it would be problematical how the court
would decide. There are a number of Wyoming cases which state that
the compensation law should be liberally construed, 10 as did the opinion
in the instant case.' But the compensation statutes in Wyoming are not the
same as in most states. The dissent in the instant case laid stress on the
fact that the Louisiana statute, from which jurisdiction the majority quoted
many cases, defined accident, for which the employer was liable, as "An
unexpected or unforseen event happening, suddenly or violently, with or
without human fault and producing symptoms of an injury." This, the
dissent claimed, explained many of the Louisiana cases. In Wyoming it
would appear that the statute goes just as far in the other direction. The
statute states that "the words 'injury and personal injury' shall not include
injuries caused by the wilful act of a third person directed against an
employee for reasons personal to such employee, or because of his employment."" A literal reading of the words "because of his employment"
appears to mean that an assault which was the result of an argument over
the manner of doing the work would not be compensable, and that it
would not be possible to reach a decision in Wyoming similar to the one
5. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & I. Co. v. Harris, 218 Ala. 130, 117 So. 755 (1928).
6. Jacquemin v. Turner & S. Mfg. Co., 92 Conn. 382, 103 A. 115, L.R.A. 1918E 496

(1918).
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156 La. 871, 101 So. 248 (1924).
Keyhea v. Woodward-Walker Lumber Co., 147 So. 830 (La. App. 1933).
112 F.2d 11 (App. D.C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649, 60 St. Ct. 1100, 84 L. Ed.

10.

McConnel v. Murphy Bros., 45 Wyo. 289, 18 P.2d 629, 88 A.L.R. 376 (1933); Pope
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 54 Wyo. 266, 91 P.2d 58 (1939); Christensen v. Sikora, 57
Wyo. 57, 112 P.2d 557 (1941); Fuhs v. Swenson, 58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942).
Wyo. Sess. Laws, 1951, c. 143, sec. 4(b); see also PS., Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, sec.

11.

1415 (1940).

72-104 (b).
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in the instant case. If this is so, then the Wyoming statute is very restrictive. What would be the result if a workman was assaulted by a third
person because he was a strikebreaker? What decision if a policeman was
shot by a person because he didn't like cops? Surely that is one of the risks
of a policeman's job, but the statute indicates that such an injury would
not be compensable. Did the legislature really intend for the statute to
have this effect? The Wyoming Constitution provides in part: "As to all
extra hazardous employment the legislature shall provide by law for the
accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be
paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent
families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of in12
In
juries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee."'
8
Fuhs v. Swenson' the court stated: "It is apparent from the constitutional
clause and the several provisions of our state law . . . that the accident
which places the employee beyond the pale of the law for the purposes of
making awards must be due solely to the 'culpable negligence' of the
injured employee." Also in Zancanelli v. Central Coal and Coke Co.14 the
court said: "the compensation law is not intended to give compensation
as damages, but is more in the nature of accident insurance."
In view of the references of the Wyoming court to a liberal construction of the compensation law and the constitutional provision previously
referred to, it appears that the court has the attitude of the liberal view.
Does the statute referred to obstruct the carrying out of the court's view
and the declared spirit of the Wyoming compensation law? That question
will have to remain unanswered until the meaning of the statute is clarified.
GLENN W. BUNDY
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ACTION AGAINST ONE WHO ENTICED THEIR PARENT?

Two minor children through guardian ad litem brought suit against
a third party who allegedly enticed their father,, thus depriving them of his
bounty, love and affection.' Defendant's motion to dismiss was based on
the theory that since the gravamen of the complaint was one for alienation
of affections it was prohibited by the state's heart-balm legislation. 2 The
12.
13.

Article 10, Sec. 4.
58 Wyo. 293, 131 P.2d 333 (1942).

14.

25 Wyo. 511, 17S P. 981 (1919).

1.
2.

The mother as guardian, brought this suit in her own name as well. It was held
her cause of action was barred by interdiction of the heart-balm which abolished
suits for alienation of affection.
Fourteen states have specific provisions dealing with alienation of affection actions:
Alabama. Ala. Code tit. 7, Sec. 114-117

(1940);

California, Cal. Civ. Code, Sec.

43.5 (1951); Colorado, Colo. Ann. Stat. C. 24A, Sec. 1-10, Michie Cum. Supp. (1952);
Florida, Fla. Ann Stat. Sec. 771.01-771.08 (1951); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. Chap. 68,
Sec#. 34-47 (1951), this statute supplanted the one interpreted by the -court in

